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 Abstract 
A glance along the finance shelves at any bookshop reveals a large number of books 
that seek to show readers how to “make a million” or “beat the market” with allegedly 
highly profitable equity trading strategies. This paper investigates whether useful 
trading strategies can be derived from popular books of investment strategy, with 
“What Works on Wall Street” by James P. O’Shaughnessy, used as an example. 
Specifically, we test whether this strategy would have produced a similarly 
spectacular performance in the UK context as was demonstrated by the author for the 
US market. As part of our investigation, we highlight a general methodology for 
determining whether the observed superior performance of a trading rule could be 
attributed in part or in entirety to data mining. Overall, we find that the O’ 
Shaughnessy rule performs reasonably well in the UK equity market, yielding higher 
returns than the FTSE All-Share Index, but lower returns than an equally weighted 
benchmark.  
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1. Introduction 
Many books have been written on how investors could enhance their wealth by 
adopting strategies suggested by authors from varied backgrounds. These authors of 
best-sellers are often key figures in large financial and to a lesser extent academic 
institutions. According to these authors, specific strategies have consistently beaten 
the market as evidenced by their personal experience or their own research.  
 
A glance along the finance shelves at any bookshop reveals that there are a large 
number of such books, and many have become best-sellers, with more than half a 
million copies of each being sold world-wide. Although many purchasers of such 
books read them for pure enjoyment and have no intention of staking money along the 
lines that the authors suggest, equally there may be many purchasers who endeavour 
to use them as a means of learning more about the way financial markets work, and as 
an aid to developing their own trading strategies. 
 
In spite of the obvious popular appeal of such texts, the vast majority of academics 
and probably many practitioners are extremely sceptical about whether such 
publications have genuine merit. The objectives of our proposed research are first, to 
survey the main best-sellers that embody information which could be viewed as 
aiding the investor’s decision about what and how to trade, and second, to evaluate 
whether such indications can be reduced to a set of formal rules. Initial investigations 
revealed that such rules can indeed be formed from many of the publications, and 
hence we attempt to evaluate the rules in a consistent and coherent fashion on a single 
set of data. Some authors have conducted small studies of their own, but it is also 
important that the replicability of these results is considered using different markets, 
longer runs of data, or different frequencies of observation. To this end, in particular, 
we also implement these strategies using data from the UK market, while the majority 
of original authors base their evidence on US data and markets. 
  
Peer-reviewed articles in academic journals are usually assumed to be rigorous in 
their application of statistical tests, and in their theoretical justification of the models 
considered. The same cannot be said of investment best-sellers, although by the same 
token, it is not appropriate to dismiss without investigation all the material that has 
not been subject to the same refereeing process as utterly worthless. The purpose of 
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this paper is therefore to conduct a formal evaluation of the merit of one of these 
popular texts, to explore whether the ideas and approaches underlying the principles 
in this best-selling text are soundly based on rigorous models well grounded in 
financial theory, and to test how robust the model are to changes in time period and 
market. As part of our investigation, we also highlight a general methodology for 
determining whether the observed superior performance of a trading rule could be 
attributed in part or in entirety to data mining. Data mining occurs when a given set of 
data is used more than once for the purposes of inference or model selection. As a 
result of such data reuse, superior results obtained may be due to chance alone rather 
than to any merit inherent in the method. The test that we employ for the effects of 
data mining is based upon the notion of nesting the selected rule within a universe of 
similar rules, and bootstrapping from this universe to determine whether the rule 
under consideration is significantly better than the others. The test, known as a 
“reality check”, is due to White (see White, 2000 or Sullivan et al, 2000), and could 
have widespread applicability as a general method for evaluating trading rules. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey 
and classification of several investment best-sellers, and describes the trading rule 
described in O’Shaugnessey’s book and how we test it. Section 3 describes the data 
employed and presents the results of our application to the London equity market. 
Section 4 describes the data snooping test, and outlines the results derived from its 
application in the context of O’Shaugnessey’s rule. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Does “What Works on Wall Street” Necessarily Work in the City? 
2.1 Survey of Best-sellers 
The best-sellers used in this project were obtained from the best-sellers list compiled 
by Amazon.com as of 4 January 1999. Amazon.com is a leading firm that provides 
online purchasing of books through the internet. Two categories under the 
“Investment” field were considered. One focuses on “Stocks” alone while the list of 
“General” incorporates the whole range of items under investments. The US rankings 
of the books reviewed on 4 January 1999 are shown below. 
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AMAZON.COM “Investing/Stocks” best-seller list 
Author Title Ranking 
William J. O’Neil How To Make Money in Stocks #2 
David N. Dreman Contrarian Investment Strategies #3 
Peter Lynch One Up on Wall Street #4  
Jeremy J. Siegel Stocks for the Long Run #5  
 
AMAZON.COM “Investing/General” best-seller list 
Author Title Ranking 
Mary Buffett Buffettology #10 
Burton G. Malkiel A Random Walk Down Wall Street #14 
James P. O’Shaughnessy What Works on Wall Street #45 
 
These books are as popular in the UK as they are in the US. To compare the 
popularity of these books in the UK, the Amazon best-seller lists for UK market are 
shown below. 
 
AMAZON.UK.COM “Investing/Stocks” best-seller list 
Author Title Ranking 
William J. O’Neil How To Make Money in Stocks #1 
David N. Dreman Contrarian Investment Strategies #2 
Jeremy J. Siegel Stocks for the Long Run #5  
Peter Lynch One Up on Wall Street #12  
 
AMAZON.UK.COM “Investing/General” best-seller list 
Author Title Ranking 
Mary Buffett Buffettology #2 
William J. O’Neil How To Make Money in Stocks #4 
Jeremy J. Siegel Stocks for the Long Run #12 
James P. O’Shaughnessy What Works on Wall Street #40 
Peter Lynch One Up on Wall Street #48  
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The structure and authorship of these books are such that they appear to fall neatly 
into one of two broad categories. Best-sellers by the “academic” group (e.g., Malkiel, 
1996; Siegel, 1998) are hesitant in providing specific trading rules and concentrate 
more on the theoretical aspects as expected. The “professionals” (e.g., 
O’Shaugnessey, 1998; Dreman, 1998; Buffett, 1997; Lynch 1989; and O’Neil, 1995), 
are bolder in this aspect as many provide testable trading rules. A further breakdown 
of the “professionals” category could be made by segregating best-sellers that have 
substantial statistical research supporting their trading rules and those without. Below 
are the authors of the best-sellers categorised into their relevant groups:   
 
For the remainder of this paper, we investigate only O’Shaugnessey’s book for 
illustrative purposes; other books will be the subjects of our future research. 
 
2.2 O’Shaugnessey’s Second Most Profitable Trading Rule 
According to O’Shaughnessy’s findings, the strategy of selecting the top 50 RPS 
(Relative Price Strength) ranked stocks with Earnings Price Ratio, EPR, of above 5% 
(i.e. Price Earnings Ratio, PER of less than 20x) turned an initial investment $10,000 
into $12,570,451 at the end of 45 years. This return is a result of investing $10,000 in 
1954 and rebalancing the portfolio annually until the end of 1996. For each year, the 
portfolio would consist of 50 equally weighted stocks. We shall refer to this strategy 
as the OSH2 strategy. This strategy generated a compounded return of 18.52%, a 
standard deviation of 24.48% and a Sharpe Ratio of 61. It is ranked second in terms of 
the highest absolute return amongst all the other strategies examined in the author’s 
book. 
 
Structure of books reviewed
 Academics   Professionals
- Malkiel
- Siegel
Statistical Backing No Research
- O’Shaughnessy - Buffett
- Dreman - Lynch
- O’Neil
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Adjusting for simple biases 
The author used stocks from the Standard & Poor’s Compustat Active Research 
database. By doing so, the results are not flawed by survivorship bias. As the London 
Share Price Database (LSPD) is adjusted for dead stocks, our study also controls for 
survivorship bias in the sense that all the data for each period consists of all of the 
stocks that were actually trading at that moment in time. 
 
To avoid look-ahead bias, O’Shaughnessey delayed forming portfolios until the end 
of the year when financial statements are released. Thus, the information used to form 
the strategy would have been publicly available at the time it was used. We again 
follow suit. For example, to build the EPR, we employed the EPS (Earnings per 
Share) as reported in the financial statement. The price used in calculating the EPR is 
the price at the end of the year following the financial fiscal year. Thus, the price is a 
year forward compared to the corresponding EPS. Stocks with negative and zero EPS 
have been excluded from our analysis.  
 
The author selected stocks that had at least $150m (at end of sample price levels) in 
market capitalisation on the grounds that it was necessary to avoid small, illiquid 
stocks that are infrequently traded and could have considerably higher transactions 
costs. The author adjusted this figure over time by incorporating the inflation rate for 
the previous years. In the spirit of this approach, we have also adjusted the minimum 
market capitalisation figure over the sample period of 1969-97 by deflating £100m 
backwards instead of the author’s $150m. We arrived at the £100m figure after 
converting US dollars to British pounds at the rate of 1.5 dollars to a pound. The value 
of £100m in the beginning of 1998 was £10.466m in 1969. Market capitalisation for 
each company is calculated by multiplying the price as of the end of the year by the 
number of ordinary shares in issue at the beginning of the year. This is done to strictly 
follow O’Shaughnessy’s strategy. 
 
Alternatively, the minimum market capitalisation could be derived by comparing the 
percentage of stocks in the NYSE that are above $150m and subsequently, using this 
percentage on the LSE to determine the appropriate minimum market capitalisation 
for this strategy. As of the 21
st
 of October 1999, there were 1,972 stocks on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). After setting the criterion of $150m on Bloomberg’s 
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Equity Search Result Criteria (ESRC) programme, the number of stocks that remained 
were 1,568. Thus, approximately 79.5% of the stocks in NYSE had a minimum 
market capitalisation of $150m. On the same day, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
had a total of 1,937 quoted stocks. The number of stocks that would constitute 79.5% 
of the LSE was 1,540. By setting a minimum market capitalisation of £5m, the total 
number of stocks turned out to be 1,517, which is close to the target of 1,540. As well 
as deflating £100m, we also test the OSH2 strategy by using £5m as the minimum 
market capitalisation. 
 
The three elements of OSH2 
The only difference in our analysis concerning the three elements of O’shaughnessy’s 
strategy is that we have applied the deflated minimum market capitalisation of each 
year individually to the respective years. However, O’Shaughnessy applied the 5 year 
average deflated market capitalisation to the respective 5 years. No particular reason 
was given for his approach.  
 
The Relative Price Strength (RPS) is simply the price index of the current price 
divided by the previous year’s price. For example if the current year-end price is 20 
and the previous year’s price is 5, then the RPS is 4. The Earnings-Price Ratio (EPR) 
is constructed by dividing the financial year Earnings Per Share (EPS) with the 
stock’s end-of-year price. After the initial selection of stocks with a deflated market 
capitalisation of £100m and an EPR of more than 5%, the portfolio would 
subsequently consist of the 50 highest RPS ranked stocks. 
 
Excluded Stocks & Returns Definition 
In this study we excluded secondary shares. Secondary shares or “class B” shares 
differ in their right to vote and receive dividends compared to Ordinary shares (“class 
A”). Secondary shares usually have limited voting privileges. 
 
In addition, we eliminated firms that belong to the industry groups of Financial Trust, 
Investment Trust and Unit Trust since these are already portfolios of shares, only 
some constituents of which will satisfy the O’Shaughnessey rules. However, foreign 
shares traded on the London Stock Exchange were included in compliance with 
O’Shaughnessy’s criteria. Returns calculated include both capital appreciation and 
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dividend received. The prices used for the return calculation are constructed as 
follows. Stocks were purchased using their actual transacted price. Should there be no 
quoted transacted price on the 31
st
 of December, the asking price would be used. 
Stocks without either price would not be purchased. Stocks were sold at their 
transacted price. Failing that, the bidding price would be used in our analysis. If a 
stock has neither a transacted nor bidding price, the transacted price for the 13
th
 month 
after purchase would be used. 
 
Stocks that were no longer listed due to cessation of trading the year following their 
selection as part of the portfolio have been dealt with by assuming a total 100% loss. 
Since the OSH2 rule requires 50 equally weighted stocks, bankruptcy would reduce 
the portfolio value by 2%. There were 2 such firms picked by the rule over the 29-
year period. A more common event was for a stock to cease listing due to a merger or 
takeover. For such stocks, returns were calculated using the last available quoted price 
for the old company. This study therefore assumes that the investor sells the shares 
outright rather than receiving shares in the acquiring or merged firm. This is rational 
since the acquiring or merged firm may not satisfy the OSH2 criteria, and should 
therefore not be part of the portfolio.  
 
3. The Data & Results of Applying O’Shaughnessy’s Strategy 
3.1 Data 
The London Share Price Database (LSPD) obtained from the London Business 
School, comprises financial particulars of 6,757 firms – i.e., all shares traded on the 
London Stock Exchange. The data spans the period 1969-1998. Portfolios are 
constructed annually from 1969 until 1997, and their performance measured one year 
later. 
 
After excluding the shares of companies as described above, the total number of firms 
examined ranged between 1085 and 2130 (fourth column of Table 1). After setting the 
3 requirements of OSH2 (EPR>5%, market capitalisation above deflated £100m and 
the 50 highest RPS ranked stocks), the sub-sample size ranged from 173 in 1971 to 
1,360 in 1979. 
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3.2 Results of Applying O’Shaughnessy’s Strategy 
Besides the OSH2 strategy, the reciprocal strategy (selecting the bottom 50 RPS 
ranked stocks) is also examined to illustrate the potential effects of data-mining. The 
results of the 50 top RPS and the 50 bottom RPS portfolios are displayed in Table 2. 
The first benchmark used to measure the performance of the strategy is the FT All 
Share (FTA) index. From 1969-97, the FTA generated an average return of 14.31% as 
indicated in Table 2.  
 
The strategy suggested by O’Shaughnessy, OSH2, out-performed the FTA by 2.59% 
per annum over 29 years. However, the average return of OSH2 is not significantly 
different from the return of the FTA All-Share (with a t-statistic of 0.567). To 
measure the risk-reward payoff, we employ the Sharpe Ratio. To calculate the Sharpe 
Ratio, we used the average arithmetic return and the risk-free rate of 9.93%, which 
was the annualised one-month Treasury bill rate. In addition to the higher return 
obtained by the OSH2 strategy, the risk involved as measured by standard deviation 
was slightly lower than the market’s. The OSH2 strategy consequently recorded a 
Sharpe Ratio of 25.23 compared to the benchmark’s 13.76.  
 
We also employed another benchmark to better match the performance of the OSH2 
strategy since this strategy involves forming an equally weighted portfolio. The 
second benchmark is produced by equally weighting the returns of all the quoted 
stocks above the minimum market capitalisation threshold for each respective year. 
Using a deflated minimum market capitalisation of £100m, the average returns were 
recorded at 20.66%. This would mean an under-performance of 3.76% by the OSH2 
strategy. The yearly performance of the strategies and the benchmarks are presented 
in Table 3. 
 
By contrast, the portfolio with the 50 lowest RPS-ranked stocks performed well. This 
portfolio significantly outperformed the FTA benchmark by a huge margin of 14.96% 
with a t-statistic of 2.56. Although the standard deviation is much higher, its 
spectacular average returns over the 29 years of study more than compensated for this 
additional risk as evidenced by its high Sharpe ratio of 47.37. Thus, constructing a 
portfolio that is in direct contrast to the one O’Shaughnessy suggested would yield the 
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highest average return over the 29 years of study compared with OSH2 and  the two 
benchmarks.  
 
An investor adopting the OSH2 strategy would turn an initial investment of £10,000 
to £375,639 over the 29 years. Graph 1 charts the log returns which provides a clearer 
illustration of analysing the current cummulative returns (Graph 2) at each point in 
time for all the portfolios investigated. Graph 3 displays the terminal wealth of the 
respective portfolios. Building the portfolio that consists of the 50 lowest RPS ranked 
stocks would reap an incredible total wealth of £4,971,732 by the end of 1998. 
However, there is no economic rationale for the performance of a portfolio 
constructed using the obverse of O’Shaughnessy’s strategy. This illustrates well the 
point that it is easy to find a highly profitable strategy that would have worked well in 
the past. However, all subsequent analysis will concentrate on OSH2 only. 
 
Return difference from using different minimum market capitalisation 
The return resulting from replication of the OSH2 strategy with a minimum deflated 
market capitalisation of £5m is only slightly higher (1%) than that obtained by using a 
minimum deflated market capitalisation of £100m, which we have done so far. The 
slightly higher return could be attributed to an increase in the number of smaller 
stocks for consideration. By lowering the deflated minimum market capitalisation to 
£5m, the total number of stocks in the sample increased by 284 firms, from the 
previous 22,728 to 23,012 firms. Due to foreseeable liquidity complications from 
using small stocks in a real application, we should be conservative and examine the 
rest of the results from using a minimum deflated market capitalisation of £100m. The 
results of using a minimum market capitalisation of £5m can be seen in Table 4.  
 
After replicating OSH2 using the 5-year average deflated market capitalisation 
approach, we find that the returns are slightly higher (0.1%) than for the original 
results. The reason for the slightly higher result (shown in Table 4) is similar to the 
one described above after replicating the OSH2 strategy using a deflated market 
capitalisation of £5m, which is the inclusion of more smaller capitalised stocks (which 
were found ex post to exhibit a higher probability of higher returns). Again, due to its 
similarity with the previous results, we do not consider this variant further. 
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Consistency of Performance and Risk Analysis over time of the OSH2 Strategy  
On a year-to-year basis, the OSH2 portfolio beat the FTA 15 times out of 29 years, 
which is equivalent to 52% of the time. Graph 4 shows the returns on a year-to-year 
basis. As can be seen, the FTA outperformed the equally weighted benchmark 12 
times, hence 41% of the time examined. 
 
Another measure of the consistency of the rule’s performance over time would be 
obtained by analysing the returns of the portfolios on a rolling basis, meaning to hold 
the portfolios for various overlapping horizons. We find that over a three-year rolling 
period, the OSH2 strategy beat the FTA index 48% of the time. Thus, investors 
buying the OSH2 portfolio would out-perform the benchmark 48% of the time, with a 
return 11% over the FTA, provided that they implemented the strategy and held the 
stocks for three years.  
 
Conducting a similar analysis but with a longer rolling period of ten years reaffirms 
the mediocre performance of the OSH2 strategy as it only beat the benchmark for 7 
out of 20 periods. Over the whole sample period, the OSH2 strategy underperformed 
the benchmark by 24%. The performance of OSH2 clearly deteriorates as the holding 
periods increase. 
 
One measure of the riskiness of the OSH2 strategy and its performance under 
different circumstances was obtained by examining the portfolio’s performance 
during different states of the market (as measured by the FTA Index). The first state 
comprises the benchmark’s worst return years, comprising all the negative returns. 
The remaining 3 states were defined by the benchmark’s level of returns, that is from 
zero to 15%, from 15% to 25% and returns of above 25%. The average returns of each 
portfolio for each separate state are shown in Table 5.  
 
During the worst return years, the OSH2 strategy exposed investors to less downside 
risk as it out-performed the benchmark by 9%, as visible from the fourth column of 
Table 5. The OSH2 strategy also out-performed during the intermediate states when 
the benchmark enjoyed returns of between 0% and 25%. As expected, the OSH2 
strategy did relatively worse during the best years, since it had been less risky during 
poor market conditions. The average under-performance of OSH2 for the FTA’s best 
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years is 16%. Tests of significance were performed on the under or over-performance 
of the OSH2 strategy over the FTA in each state. However, none of these results are 
statistically significant. 
 
4. The Data Snooping Test 
Data-snooping or data-mining involves searching through databases for correlations 
and patterns, and is considered a notorious bias in assessing a trading strategy. When 
a given set of data is reused over and over again, the probability of finding a 
satisfactory result is high. As stated by Jensen and Bennington (1970), “…given 
enough computer time, we are sure that we can find a mechanical trading rule which 
works on a table of random numbers – provided of course that we are allowed to test 
the rule on the same table of numbers”.  
 
The pitfalls of data-snooping were again highlighted in an article by Washington 
(1998). She gave an example of David Leinweber’s (managing director of First 
Quadrant, LP, Pasadena, California) reported search for the best predictor of the 
S&P500 using the United Nations CD-ROM. As it turned out, Leinweber discovered 
that butter production in Bangladesh was historically the best predictor. 
 
It is difficult to determine whether an apparently significant relationship or profitable 
opportunity (from back-testing) occurred as a consequence of chance alone or 
whether the relationship has genuine predictive capability. Data-snooping could arise 
from researchers torturing a set of data as well as a consequence of survivorship bias 
operating on the entire universe of technical trading rules that have been considered 
historically. The latter, also known as inter-generational data snooping, would occur 
over time as profitable trading rules become popular and remain within the investment 
community while the bad ones fade away. This is particularly apparent in the case of 
technical trading rules. Technical trading rules, without any fundamental basis, are 
susceptible to inter-generation data-snooping. Investors would apply a certain 
technical rule without much thought if they know that it had worked in the past for the 
creator of that rule. Technical trading rules are easy to operate and to improvise, thus 
the probability of finding a variant to an original rule that works would be very high. 
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The negative effects of data-snooping have been acknowledged by Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990). In their research, they found that tests of financial asset pricing models (e.g., 
the CAPM) may yield misleading inferences when properties of the data are used to 
construct the test statistics. The properties mentioned relate to the construction of 
portfolios based on some empirically motivated characteristic of the stock such as 
market capitalisation. The test of financial asset pricing models performed on the 
returns of these portfolios may create potentially significant biases in the test 
statistics. In this case, data-snooping occurs when researchers sort portfolios 
according to how this was done in previous studies, thus the term “empirically 
motivated characteristic”. When the authors sorted the portfolios based on market 
capitalisation (empirically motivated), the null hypothesis of zero-intercept (excess 
return over market premium) was rejected whereas sorting on theoretically relevant 
characteristics such as dividend yield did not result in rejection. To this end, the 
authors suggest that data-instigated grouping procedures should be employed 
cautiously.  
 
Kahn (1998) suggests four guidelines on how we can safeguard against data mining 
biases. The intuition guideline demands the investigation of only those strategies that 
are plausible and with some ex ante expectation of success. Research work should 
never involve free-ranging searches for patterns without regard for intuition. The 
restraint guideline attempts to minimize the number of strategies investigated. 
Researchers should decide ex ante exactly which strategies to investigate, run their 
tests, and look at the answers. They should not go back and continually refine their 
investigations. The sensibility guideline deletes results that seem improbably 
successful. Extremely large observed t-statistics may signal database errors or an 
improper methodology rather than a new and plausible strategy. Finally, out-of-
sample testing is the statistician's answer to the curse of data mining. Coincidences 
observed over one data set are quite unlikely to reoccur in another independent data 
set. Most current studies on investment strategies do implement out-of-sample testing 
in their research.  
 
Sullivan, Timmermann and White (1999) (hereafter STW) argue that genuinely 
meaningful out-of-sample testing is difficult to carry out as the exact identity and 
functional form of the model to be tested is not suggested by theory; for example, the 
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identification of factors and anomalies in cross-sectional tests of asset pricing models. 
STW suggest a bootstrap methodology that would be able to quantify the data-
snooping bias. 
 
 4.1 How the Bootstrap Procedure Works 
Why use the bootstrap? In simple situations, we can gauge the uncertainty of an 
estimate by analytical calculation based on an assumed probability model. However, 
in more complicated problems, this approach would be difficult and possibly 
inoperable. Its results may potentially be misleading if inappropriate assumptions or 
simplifications have been made. Bootstrapping essentially resamples the original data 
to create replicate datasets, from which the variability of the quantities of interest can 
be assessed without long-winded and error-prone analytical calculation. A wide range 
of statistical problems can be tackled by bootstrapping, thus we can avoid having to 
oversimplify complex problems.  
 
For instance, assumptions required to validly construct t-ratios (normal, stationary and 
time-independent distributions) can be relaxed, which is clearly desirable since stock 
returns exhibit leptokurtosis, autocorrelation, conditional heteroscedasticity and 
changing conditional means. Thus, the bootstrap can accommodate fat tails, jumps 
and other departures from the normal distribution. It should be noted that the 
bootstrap method assumes that entities being resampled (the returns) are independent. 
This can be overcome using a technique known as the moving block bootstrap, 
although we do not explore this issue further here. A further potential limitation of the 
bootstrap is that the bootstrapped distributions may be a poor approximation to the 
actual distributions when utilising a small sample size.  
 
In carrying out their research, STW utilised the technical trading rules from Brock, 
Lakonishok and LeBaron’s (1992) (hereafter BLL) study. BLL had been unable to 
comprehensively account for data-snooping biases. They mitigated the problem by 
emphasising the robustness of results across various non-overlapping sub-periods, 
reporting results from 26 trading rules and utilising a very long data series (1897 to 
1986). STW developed the Reality Check bootstrap methodology that would enable 
researchers to conduct a comprehensive test across rules (any number) in a manner 
not previously possible. This test would evaluate the performance of the trading rules 
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in terms of whether any apparent superior performance is a result of superior 
economic content or just due to luck. 
 
Since data-snooping could arise from survivorship bias of the trading rules from the 
entire universe, STW decided to expand BLL’s 26 rules into a universe of nearly 
7,846 trading rules. STW’s results would be deemed more plausible as their research 
is not based solely on the subset of surviving trading rules that may be misleading 
since it does not account for the full set of initial trading rules (failed and unpopular). 
 
The Reality Check bootstrap is basically a nonparametric bootstrap. Briefly, 
nonparametric analysis assumes that X1,…,Xn are independently and identically 
distributed according to an unknown distribution function F. Equal probabilities n
-1
 
are placed on each sample value, thus each simulated sample point, X
*
 , is 
independently sampled at random from those data values. Thus the simulated sample 
X1
*,…,Xn
*
 is a random sample taken with replacement from the data.  
 
The objective of the reality check is to evaluate the distribution of a suitable 
performance measure (the absolute return or Sharpe ratio) giving consideration to the 
full set of models that led to the best-performing trading rule. The test is based on the 
following l x 1 performance statistic: 





T
Rt
tfnf 1
ˆ1
         (1) 
where :  
)ˆ,(ˆ 1 ttt Zff  , Zt  = vector of dependent and predictor variables, 1
ˆ
t   = vector of 
estimated parameters, n   = number of prediction periods, thus, 1 RTn , l    = 
number of technical trading rules. 
 
The f equation above differs from White’s statistic of )ˆ(1 t
T
Rt
tfPf 


  because 
estimated parameters are not needed for this application. Returns are generated 
through the parameterisations of the trading rules ( kˆ , k=1, … l). Technical trading 
rules, k, are assessed by the following equation: 
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 lkttktkttk SySyf ,.....100111, )],,(1ln[)],(1ln[      (2) 
where 
R
iitXt 0}{  is the Original Dow Jones price series (the FTA series in our 
case), 
t
tt
t
X
XX
Y
)( 1
1

   is the per period return, )(kS  and )(0 S  are signal functions 
that convert price index information, t  into market positions. 
 
The null hypothesis to test whether there exists a superior technical trading rule is that 
the performance of the best rule from the universe is no better than the performance of 
the benchmark. Rejecting the null hypothesis below means that the best rule achieved 
significantly superior performance to the benchmark. 
  0)(max:
,..,1


k
lk
o fEH  
The null hypothesis can be evaluated by applying the bootstrap to the observed values 
of returns, f tk , . Resampling the returns from the trading rules will yield B 
bootstrapped values of 

kf , denoted as 

ik
f
, . The statistics that measure performance 
for the actual rules in the universe and for the bootstrapped rules are respectively is 
constructed as 
 
  k
lk
l fnV
,..,1
max

          (3) 
   BiffnV kik
lk
il ,..,1,max ,
,..,1
, 


        (4) 
 
To summarise, the effects of data-snooping operating over time and across many 
investors and researchers, can only be quantified when one considers the performance 
of the best trading rule in the context of a full universe of trading rules form that this 
rule originated. Thus, the former equation (3) selects the trading rule with the highest 
average return. Equation (4), the order statistic would select the rule with the largest 
difference between te average bootstrapped value and the actual return for each i 
bootstrap series. 
 
White’s Reality Check p-value for the null hypothesis can be obtained by comparing 
lV to the quantiles of ilV ,

(the order statistic). This is achieved by sorting the order 
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statistics as 

BVVV ,..,, 21 . Then find b such that 



 1bb VVV . Hence, the Reality 
Check p-value is written as 
B
b
PRC 1           (5) 
The Reality Check p-value incorporates the effects of data-snooping since it 
accounted for the maximum value over all the l trading rules.   
 
4.2. Steps Involved in the Implementation of the Bootstrap Procedure for OSH2 
and Related Rules 
1. Set an observation period, n, for t = R , …, T. In our application, there are 29 
observation periods, starting with the year 1970 to 1998. 
2. Next, the percentage returns, incorporating both capital gains and dividends are 
calculated for each stock. Percentage returns are used because it would allow the 
computation of average returns of a portfolio of stocks for each time space. For 
the benchmark, we utilised the average returns of all the listed stocks with 
available return values. Thus, both the returns of individual stock and the equally 
weighted benchmark are determined for each t. Using the specified model 
specifications, 1, tkf , derive the over or under-performance of each l  trading rules 
over the benchmark for n periods.  
3.   Construct and average the performance criterion to obtain, 



T
Rt
tkk fnf 1,
1    
4. Develop the universe of trading rules. We have expanded the suggested trading 
rule by O’Shaughnessy of selecting the 50 highest RPS stocks with a market 
capitalisation below a deflated £100m and an EPR of more than 5% into 3,864 
variants of the original trading rule. As with the original rule, we applied the 
deflated market capitalisation to a pre-set range of £5m to £1bn for the universe. 
The EPR range from 0 to 20% and the portfolio size examined varies from 1 stock 
to 100 stocks. The variable elements responsible for the creation of the universe 
are displayed below. 
 
EPR Portfolio Size Market cap* 
0.000 1 5000 
0.005 5 25000 
0.010 10 50000 
0.015 15 75000 
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0.020 20 100000 
0.025 25 200000 
0.030 30 500000 
0.035 35 1000000 
0.040 40  
0.045 45  
0.050 50  
0.055 55  
0.060 60  
0.065 65  
0.070 70  
0.075 75  
0.080 80  
0.085 85  
0.090 90  
0.095 95  
0.100 100  
0.150   
0.200   
*In thousands of pounds 
 
5. Specify the number of bootstrap resamples, B. In our case we set B = 500. White 
developed an observation index before constructing the bootstrap values for each 
trading rule. The observation index is created so that every 3,864 trading rules 
would be bootstrapped by the same sequence of random picks. Thus, for each 
trading rule, the bootstrap will be performed using the same sequence of the 29 
random observations over 500 times. Since random selection is done by 
replacement, repetition of a certain observation could exist for a particular i series. 
Instead of creating the observation index, we fixed the random number seed in our 
program. This procedure would have the equivalent result as building the 
observation index as the same set of random numbers are used which will 
generate the same set of index numbers for each rule. For each i series, find the 
average of the bootstrap values for each trading rule, 

ik
f
, . 
6. For each trading rule, set kk fnV  and  kikik ffnV   ,, , the latter being 
the average of each i series less the average return of that trading rule. 
7. When we have all the values for all the trading rules, we could obtain the Reality 
Check p-values as described in the section above. 
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4.2 Results from Application of the Data Snooping Test 
For the full sample period between 1970 and 1998, the best rule from the universe of 
3,864 trading rules recorded a mean return of 25.38% over the FTA benchmark. This 
trading rule suggested the purchase of the top 20 ranked RPS stocks with a market 
capitalisation of more than £200m and an earnings yield, EPR, of above 20% 
(PER<5x). Since the best rule recorded a Reality Check p-value of 0.346 (fourth 
column of Table 6), we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the 
performance of the best trading rule has no statistically significant predictive 
superiority over the given benchmark.  
 
The magnitude of the data-snooping bias could be clearly identified once we produce 
the nominal p-value on the best trading rule. The nominal or the “data-mined” p-value 
can be obtained by applying the bootstrap methodology to the best rule only. By 
excluding the other rules we would ignore the effects of data-snooping. The nominal 
p-value computed for the best trading rule decreased tremendously as expected. The 
best trading rule would appear to be potentially credible with its low nominal p-value 
of 0.032. However, if we adjust for data-snooping biases, through the use of the 
Reality Check p-value, we can conclude outright that the best trading rule is not 
significantly superior. The difference between the two p-values represents the 
magnitude of the data-snooping bias on the performance measure. Using the Reality 
Check p-value, we can quantify precisely the evidence against the null hypothesis in a 
manner previously impossible. We can also quantify the extent to which data-mining 
can mislead the unsuspecting researcher. 
 
The strategy suggested by O’Shaughnessy, OSH2, recorded a very insignificantly 
superior performance, with a nominal p-value of 0.3, and thus in actual fact we need 
not bother proceeding with computing the Reality Check p-value for the universe in 
this case. 
 
Table 6 also displays the best trading rule for the two almost equally long sub-periods; 
sub-period 1 from 1970 to 1984 and sub-period 2 from 1985 to 1998. For both the 
sub-periods, rules that outperformed the benchmark could be constructed, but again 
these failed to deliver low Reality Check p-values. Thus in both sub-periods, the 
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performance of the respective best trading rules were not significantly superior to the 
benchmark.  
 
4.3 Can a trader possibly gain from using the best trading rule? 
Suppose now that a trader conducts a historical search to find the best rule with the 
greatest cumulative return and applies it in the subsequent year. By doing so, a trader 
could implement the current best strategy without the knowledge of how well it will 
do in the subsequent year whereby money is committed. Hence, we would analyse 28 
years instead of 29 years of data due to this time lag.  
 
Two different analyses were conducted, as there were occasions where more than one 
best rule existed. Consequently, the performance in the following year could differ 
between these trading rules. Thus, we examine the lowest returns (which we call the 
“Pessimistic scenario”) and the highest returns (termed the “Optimistic scenario”) 
from the range of past best trading rules.  
 
From the second column of Table 7, it can be seen that the cumulative wealth rule 
underperformed the benchmark by 4% under the Pessimistic scenario and by 3% 
under the Optimistic scenario. Hence, even with the knowledge of the best cumulative 
return rule in one year, an investor will not be able to exploit it in the following year.  
 
Suppose an investor implements the rule with the best previous year’s returns. Would 
this make money? As can be seen in the fourth column in Table 7, this strategy will 
still underperform the benchmark by 3% under the Pessimistic scenario. However, 
this is a slight improvement from the cummulative wealth rule. The only trading rule 
that would produce excess return is the Optimistic scenario of the Previous Year’s 
best rule. Investors could potentially earn excess return of 11%, although this return is 
not statistically significant. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated whether profitable trading strategies can be derived from 
popular books of investment strategy, with “What Works on Wall Street” by James P. 
O’Shaughnessy, used as an example. With an abundance of evidence on the 
effectiveness of momentum and low PER strategies in the US and the UK, the OSH2 
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strategy would be expected to perform well. To a certain extent, OSH2 was indeed 
successful, out-performing the FTA All-Share index over the past 30 years.  
 
But how successful was the strategy in the UK compared with that delivered in the 
US? In the US context, OSH2 generated an average return of 18.52% per annum, 
which is 8.57% more than the Dow Jones Industrial Average and 7.97% more than the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 benchmark. By contrast, OSH2 only managed to beat the 
FTA All-share by 2.59%, and viewed from this perspective, OSH2 would not have 
been nearly as successful in the UK as in the US.  
 
We also applied a new test for the effects of data mining on the results from applying 
the trading rules. This test is based on a bootstrap procedure, and involves nesting the 
rule under test within a universe of similar rules based on the same criteria. We were 
able to determine that no trading rules from within the O’Shaughnessey family are 
able to yield statistically significantly higher (or significantly lower) returns than the 
benchmark. We believe that the approach taken here should be viewed as a general, 
easily interpreted and widely applicable approach to auditing new investment trading 
strategies.  
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Table 1: Number of Firms Examined  
    
Year Sample firms Rejected firms Total firms after first filter* 
69 250 901 1,151 
70 271 814 1,085 
71 173 1,255 1,428 
72 207 1,223 1,430 
73 374 1,012 1,386 
74 589 764 1,353 
75 454 1,794 2,248 
76 1,042 1,109 2,151 
77 785 1,261 2,046 
78 1,112 914 2,026 
79 1,360 679 2,039 
80 1,263 513 1,776 
81 1,075 682 1,757 
82 914 810 1,724 
83 855 847 1,702 
84 847 878 1,725 
85 914 797 1,711 
86 793 971 1,764 
87 813 980 1,793 
88 921 890 1,811 
89 1,045 771 1,816 
90 1,122 668 1,790 
91 1,041 684 1,725 
92 803 851 1,654 
93 544 1,142 1,686 
94 670 1,115 1,785 
95 789 1,129 1,918 
96 854 1,189 2,043 
97 848 1,282 2,130 
*Excludes secondary shares and shares belonging to the Trust Industry 
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Table 2: The Average Return of OSH2, Reciprocal Strategy & the Benchmarks. 
 50 Lowest  50 Highest FTSE  Equally-Weighted 
 RPS RPS All Share* Benchmark 
Average Return 0.3177 0.1690 0.1431 0.2066 
Std Deviation 0.4628 0.2707 0.3097 0.3118 
Sharpe Ratio 47.37 25.23 13.76 34.16 
*Datastream ICV; Figures are annualised and expressed as a proportion of the initial investment 
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Table 3:Replication Results & the Benchmark Performance 
Performance  50 Lowest  50 Highest FTSE  Equally-Weighted 
Year RPS RPS (OSH2) All Share Benchmark 
70 -0.1238 0.0825 -0.0752 -0.0202 
71 0.6616 0.7879 0.4193 0.5512 
72 0.3427 0.4517 0.1282 0.2019 
73 -0.2500 -0.1969 -0.3136 -0.3075 
74 -0.5422 -0.4534 -0.5534 -0.5035 
75 1.1468 0.5035 1.3633 1.0923 
76 0.0860 0.2146 -0.0387 0.0242 
77 1.0812 0.6539 0.4118 0.7914 
78 0.3186 0.2552 0.0265 0.2411 
79 -0.0334 0.0166 0.0435 0.0636 
80 0.0742 0.0109 0.2717 0.0856 
81 0.1160 -0.0422 0.0715 0.1639 
82 0.1666 0.3505 0.2207 0.2445 
83 0.5720 0.1505 0.2310 0.4262 
84 0.1718 0.1763 0.2602 0.1904 
85 0.1144 0.1264 0.1518 0.1988 
86 0.2902 0.5758 0.2234 0.3267 
87 0.3882 0.1795 0.0416 0.1597 
88 0.0517 0.0602 0.0648 0.0992 
89 0.1105 -0.0567 0.3001 0.1184 
90 -0.3291 -0.2493 -0.1431 -0.2134 
91 0.3189 0.4206 0.1506 0.2468 
92 0.3649 0.1046 0.1483 0.1300 
93 0.9867 0.3720 0.2335 0.6213 
94 0.8844 -0.0526 -0.0955 0.1103 
95 0.1099 0.1283 0.1851 0.3439 
96 0.8779 0.1520 0.1168 0.4588 
97 1.3581 0.0974 0.1973 0.1633 
98 -0.1025 0.0800 0.1091 -0.0187 
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Table 4: Return Difference from using different minimum market capitalisation 
and averaging over 5 years.  
Replicating OSH2 using deflated Market Capitalisation of £5m 
 Highest 50 RPS  
Average Returns 0.1797  
Std Deviation 0.2752  
Sharpe Ratio 0.2920  
Compounded Return 0.1471  
   
   
Replicating the OSH2 using the 5 year average deflated market 
capitalisation of £100m 
 Highest 50 RPS  
Average Returns 0.1702  
Std Deviation 0.2727  
Sharpe Ratio 0.2599  
Compounded Return 0.1380  
 
Table 5: Portfolio Performance during different States of FTA 
Different States   OSH2  FTA OSH2-FTSE Respective Years t-statistic at 5% Level 
< 0% (worst returns) -0.1092 -0.2033 0.0941 74,73,90,94,70,76 1.9116 
0% - 15% returns 0.1397 0.0833 0.0564 78,87,79,88,81,98,96,72,92 1.1777 
15% - 25% returns 0.2777 0.1992 0.0785 91,85,95,97,82,86,83,93 1.3005 
> 25% (best returns) 0.3460 0.5044 -0.1584 84,80,89,77,71,75 -0.8741 
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics for the Performance of the Rules in the Universe 
 
Table 7: Potential Profits from implementing the universe of rules 
 Cummulative 
Wealth Rule 
Implementing Previous 
 Year's Best Rule 
 Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic 
Mean over benchmark -0.0382 -0.0268 -0.0172 0.1126 
Reality Check p-value n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a* 
Nominal p-value 0.6000 0.5580 0.5580 0.1160 
* Does not apply because the Cummulative Wealth Rule & the Previous Year’s Best Rule are not the 
best trading rule ex-post. 
Best performing rule : Subperiod Subperiod Full Sample
1970-84 1985-98 1970-98
Market cap above £1,000m £200m £200m
Portfolio size 1 stock 20 stocks 20 stocks
EPR above 20% 20% 20%
Mean over benchmark 0.1852 0.4454 0.2538
Reality Check p-value 0.6520 0.2440 0.3460
Nominal p-value 0.0720 0.0440 0.0320
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Graph 1: Cumulative Log Returns of OSH2 Strategy 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Cummulative Returns 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Log Returns over 29 Years
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Graph 2: Cummulative Returns over 29 Years
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Graph 3: Terminal Value of the OSH2 Portfolio 
 
 
 
 
 
 Graph 4: Yearly Performance of the OSH2 portfolio relative to the Equally –
Weighted Benchmark & the FTA 
 
  
 
Graph 3: End Wealth/Terminal Value of £10,000 Investment
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Graph 4: Portfolio Performance Relative to FTA & Equally-Weighted Benchmarks
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